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I. INTRODUCTION
In early January of 2021, President Donald Trump and some of his
constituents, such as Stephen Bannon—a former White House chief
strategist—were banned or suspended from their social media accounts by
ten of the largest social media sites, including Facebook, YouTube, and
Twitter.1 The duration of these bans ranged from indefinite to permanent.2
Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter were the leaders of the censorship
campaign, reasoning that the accounts created a “risk of further incitement
of violence” after accounts began circulating Trump’s accusations of
election fraud and his statements during the storming of the Capitol
building in Washington D.C.3
Trump’s presidential term was controversial, marked by polarization in
party allegiance and scrutiny of the media. Specifically relevant to this
Article is Trump highlighting social media platforms’ abilities to block
access to or remove user accounts and posts.4 The storming of the Capitol
1. Hannah Denham, These Are The Platforms That Have Banned Trump And His
Allies, THE WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2021), washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/01/11/trumpbanned-social-media [https://perma.cc/JR34-88B7]. For this Article, a social networking
site (“social media website”) is defined as a website that helps people communicate,
socialize, and share information with other groups of people. Social Networking Site,
CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/socialnetworking-site [https://perma.cc/JQF6-X3EU]. Additionally, Facebook, as used in this
Article, will refer to both the social media site and the company, as the company’s renaming to
Meta is still relatively new and uncertain during this Article’s publication process. See
Mike Isaac, Facebook Renames Itself Meta, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2021), https://www.
nytimes.com/2021/10/28/technology/facebook-meta-name-change.html [https://perma.cc/SQ76BP6R].
2. Denham, supra note 1.
3. Denham, supra note 1.
4. See Jessica Guynn, Biden and Section 230: New administration, same problems for
Facebook, Google and Twitter as under Trump, USA T ODAY (Jan. 20, 2021),
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building was not the first time the platforms’ abilities to block access to
or remove user accounts and posts came under scrutiny.5 For instance, in
June of 2020, conservative political party members were outraged over
alleged censored campaign advertisements and other blocked political
messages. 6 Then, in July of 2020, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and
Squarespace censored doctors’ advice about COVID-19 treatments and
prevention methods declaring a video from the America’s Frontline Doctors
Summit spread misinformation related to COVID-19.7 Despite the platforms’
dismissive labeling of the potential cures and treatments discussed at the
Summit, there is a legitimate public interest in hearing licensed medical
professionals discuss options of treatment, and more broadly, other variations
of opinion.
In both the banning of Trump’s accounts and the blocking of the
doctors’ medical advice, the social platforms reasoned that the removal or
blocking of the content served to prevent the spread of misinformation.8
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2021/01/20/biden-trump-censorship-section-230google-facebook-scrutiny/4238357001 [https://perma.cc/N5E7-KLGY].
5. See Wendy Davis, Conservative Activists To Pursue ‘Censorship’ Battle Against
Tech Companies, MEDIA P OST (June 29, 2020), https://www.mediapost.com/publications/
article/353123/conservative-activists-to-pursue-censorship-batt.html [https://perma.cc/
ZF7W-8XUX].
6. See id.
7. Caroline Warnock, America’s Frontline Doctors Summit COVID-19 Video Called
‘False Information’, HEAVY (July 28, 2020), https://heavy.com/news/2020/07/americafrontline-doctors-summit/ [https://perma.cc/E8RZ-MQ9S]; see also Stephanie Dwilson,
America’s Frontline Doctors’ Website Expired: Squarespace Site Down, HEAVY (July 28,
2020), https://heavy.com/news/2020/07/americas-frontline-doctors-website-expired-down
[https://perma.cc/2VXF-ET55]. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Squarespace are all social
media websites. Facebook is a site that uses a “Newsfeed” consisting of users posting
pictures, videos, and text allowing other users to see, share, and respond to the post. Chaim
Gartenberg, What is Facebook? Just ask Mark Zuckerberg, THE VERGE (Mar. 9, 2019),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/8/18255269/facebook-mark-zuckerberg-definition-socialmedia-network-sharing-privacy [https://perma.cc/RUZ6-KS6E]. YouTube is a video-sharing
platform that encourages users to make appealing videos and also watch other user videos.
What is YouTube?, DIGITAL UNITE, https://www.digitalunite.com/technology-guides/tv-video/
youtube/what-youtube [https://perma.cc/DTR6-3EK2]. Twitter is a micro- blogging site where
users can post short 280-character posts called “Tweets” that communicate with other users. Paul
Gill, What Is Twitter & How Does It Work?, LIFEWIRE (Aug. 29, 2021), https://www.life
wire.com/what-exactly-is-twitter-2483331 [https://perma.cc/5V8M-KYJ6]. Lastly, Squarespace
is a website building platform, with blogging and hosting services, that lets businesses of all
types create websites and network with each other. Sara Angeles, How to Use Squarespace to
Build a Website for Your Business, BUS. NEWS DAILY (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.business
newsdaily.com/5484-how-to-use-squarespace.html [https://perma.cc/BU6X-2E5Y].
8. See Davis, supra note 5; see also Dwilson, supra note 7.
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Regardless of the circumstances, such instances demonstrate the ability of
social media organizations to broadly remove information across their
user audience and render information unavailable to the public. These
examples highlight the potential for viewpoint discrimination, which refers
to singling out particular perspectives and suppressing those perspectives.9
For individualized viewpoint discrimination to occur, individuals must
first avail themselves of the platforms’ services. One must qualify as a
social media platform user before facing potential viewpoint discrimination.
To become a user of any of these major platforms, the user must agree to
the respective platform’s Terms of Service when creating an account. The
Terms of Service, also known as “Terms of Use” or “Terms and Conditions,”
is a contract between the social media company and the user.10 The social
media user legally assents to the site’s Terms of Service even without
performing any affirmative act, such as clicking on an agreement through
a hyperlink or radio button. 11 Users—often unknowingly—waive all
meaningful rights, warranties, and remedies, while the platform asserts its
interests to the limits of the law. 12 For example, Facebook’s Terms of
Service limits the “aggregate liability” arising out of or related to “these
Terms” or the “Facebook Products” to not “exceed the greater of $100 or
the amount you have paid [Facebook] in the past twelve months.”13
Platforms’ broad regulatory power over their own users enables platforms
to discriminate against the users by inhibiting users that do not share the
platforms’ own viewpoints. As private companies, social platforms are
entitled to self-regulate their businesses and form their own beneficial
contracts. Because social media platforms are private companies, social
9. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 316–319 (1988) (offering an example of a
viewpoint-based regulation found to be discriminatory on its face; statute was viewpoint
discriminatory because it singled out one particular perspective—criticism of foreign
governments—for suppression).
10. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Wolves of the World Wide Web: Reforming
Social Networks’ Contracting Practices, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1431, 1450–51 (2014).
11. Id. at 1451.
12. Id.
13. Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php [https://perma.cc/
2TCP-26NC]. Additionally, if Facebook determines that a user “clearly, seriously or
repeatedly breached” the “Terms or Policies,” including the “Community Standards,”
Facebook “may suspend or permanently disable access” to the account. Id. Facebook
“may also suspend or disable” the account if a user “repeatedly infringe[s] other people’s
intellectual property rights” or where “required to do so for legal reasons.” Id. Facebook
does prohibit forms of lawful speech on its website including “hate speech,” defined as a
direct attack against people on the basis of protected characteristics: race, ethnicity, national
origin, disability, religious affiliation, caste, sexual orientation, sex, gender identity and
serious disease. Unlawful acts Facebook prohibits include violations of “intellectual
property rights” and “fraud.” Facebook Community Standards, META, https://transparency.
fb.com/policies/community-standards/ [https://perma.cc/JZ6D-W5EZ].
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media users face the continual threat of discriminatory post removal without
any legal civil remedies.
But what happens when platforms remove important content regarding
topics like politics, social movements, or healthcare? Or if the platforms
funnel the content to the extreme, eliminating millions of people’s access
to minority viewpoints? The problem is the size, scope, and control of the
platforms over users; the platforms connect billions of people daily, and
have exclusive control over informing billions of people, selectively organizing
what people see and can say on their timelines. As the platforms are
centered around user expression via their users’ posts, and exercise control
over user expression, why not treat the platforms as a governmental
structure in terms of how the platforms regulate posts? Or, alternatively,
why not create some sort of independent unit to oversee uniform and fair
review of user complaints regarding removal of content? These questions
will be addressed and answered as this Article explores the issues and
concerns surrounding the extent of platforms’ censorship abilities, and
how those abilities impact everyday users of the platforms.
This Article will compare 47 U.S.C. § 230 (“Section 230”), the United
States law governing civil claims that prevent social media companies from
being treated like the publishers of their own users’ posts and the
companies’ abilities to remove user posts, with the European Union’s
(“EU”) equivalent governing law, the E-commerce Directive.14 The ECommerce Directive will be used as an example of a governmental regulation
that better prevents viewpoint discrimination, but at the cost of a lower
standard of user expression. A lower standard of user expression means
diminished rights in exercising free speech, as exemplified by the EU
outlawing broader categories of speech than the US (Section III covers
this point in detail). Then, this Article will demonstrate how the US may
achieve the goal of decreasing discretionary power of platforms’ content
removal abilities, thereby minimizing viewpoint discrimination of lawful
user-posted content, while preserving private governance of social media
business practices.
Section II provides background on social media users, platform content
regulation, and content removal practices. It continues with a discussion
of the enormous amount of content social media platforms are responsible
for monitoring and governing. Additionally, the relationships of social
14. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2018); Council Directive 2000/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EC)
[hereinafter Council Directive 2000/31].
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media companies, governments, and users are explained in connection
with social media content moderation. Lastly, Section II summarizes the
First Amendment’s boundaries on protection of speech and clarifies
freedom of expression for US citizens only from government actors, leaving
private platforms content removal practices currently out of the First
Amendment’s reach.
Section III lays out the social media content regulation laws governing
both the US and the EU. Historically, the US’s Section 230 has been
referred to as the “26 words that created the internet” due to its thorough
protection of private online platforms from third-party (“intermediary”)
liability arising from civil suits like defamation, and general allowance for
platforms to leave up or take down content voluntarily. 15 Contrarily, the
EU’s E-commerce Directive offers platforms safe harbor from legal liability
with two main requirements: the platform must (1) not have “actual
knowledge of illegal activity,” and (2) “act expeditiously to remove” illegal
activity once actual knowledge is obtained.16 This section concludes by
illustrating the EU’s approach to social media content regulation and
reviewing its implications on viewpoint discrimination in social platform
content moderation.
Section IV discusses the deficiencies of Section 230 in its approach to
platform content moderation. The analysis will continue with the three
main problems arising from Section 230’s current application, which
allows social media companies: (1) overbroad discretionary authority, (2)
the ability to operate with limited transparency, and (3) the ability to
discriminate based on viewpoint. Additionally, the Article will explore the
implementation and significance of the ground-breaking independent
Facebook Oversight Board on providing an appellate process for wrongful
censorship of posts.
Section V proposes two solutions to the three previously listed issues of
Section 230(c) addressed in this Article. The first solution is statutory
revision of Section 230(c)(2). There are two statutory revisions proposed
in the first solution: (1) revision of the statute to grant immunity to social
media platforms only if the platforms remove content that is illegal or
otherwise unprotected by the First Amendment, and (2) introduction of a
“bad faith” clause that removes platform immunity if the plaintiff can
prove their lawful post was removed as a result of viewpoint discrimination.
The second solution suggests federal statutes mandating large social media
platforms create their own independent oversight boards. These Social
Media Oversight Boards will be primarily based on Facebook’s Oversight

15.
16.
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Board, with the new Oversight Boards’ purpose being independent review
of platform censorship practices through a board review process.
II. BACKGROUND ON SOCIAL MEDIA, PLATFORM CONTENT
REGULATION METHODS, AND FIRST
AMENDMENT ISSUES
This section will start by covering the monthly global reach of social
media companies and how social media companies regulate online content.
Next, this section will describe algorithms and their advantages and
disadvantages as content-filtering tools used to sort content and will
describe the inverted-triangle model relationship between governments,
social media companies, and speakers. The section will end with an explanation
of why First Amendment claims fail to beat Section 230’s civil liability
immunity.
A. Social Media Users, Content Regulation, and Content-Bubbles
Social media websites are currently used by a significant portion of the
global population. As of July 2020, 4.574 billion people worldwide
regularly use the internet, with 3.96 billion of those individuals also being
social media users.17 For this Article, an individual qualifies as a “social
media user” if he or she accesses a social media website at least once per
month.18 Social media users utilize social media platforms for a multitude
of purposes—socializing, working, networking, collaborating, revenue
generating—all while on the couch, at the office, or on the go.19
Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, three of the largest recognized global
social media providers, respectively recorded 2.449 billion, 2.0 billion,
and 340 million active monthly social media users worldwide as of January
2020.20 Regionally, the United States reported 295 million active social

17. J. Clement, Global Digital Population as of July 2020, STATISTA (July 24, 2020),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/617136/digitalpopulationworldwide/#:~:text=Almos
t%204.57%20billion%20people%20were,percent%20of%20the%20global%20population
[https://perma.cc/6URL-RJPA].
18. See Simon Kemp, Digital 2020: 3.8 Billion People Use Social Media,
WEARESOCIAL (Jan. 30, 2020), https://wearesocial.com/blog/2020/01/digital-2020-3-8billion-people-use-social-media [https://perma.cc/D4WC-PZRM].
19. Id.
20. Id.
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media users in 2021.21 Europe reported 325.70 million active social media
users per month as of January 1, 2021.22 Besides websites, social platforms
also utilize mobile apps to appeal to more potential users through
convenience and ease of use.23
In terms of content regulation, the social media platform serves as the
gatekeeper to its own site, either passively accepting or actively rejecting
the content its users post and the content other users view on the platform.24
The high volume of users on the major sites contribute to the exponentially
growing levels of individual content creation. To illustrate, Facebook has
350 million photos uploaded every day, or 4,000 photos uploaded per
second.25 YouTube has 500 hours of video uploaded every minute. 26
Twitter, on average, has around 6,000 tweets tweeted per second, or 500
million tweets per day. 27 The continuously increasing flood of content
requires social media organizations to use complex measures to regulate
the torrent of content posted on their platforms.28
The modern measures utilized by social media platforms in approaching
content moderation and content removal are shared across the social
media industry, and include human and algorithmic types of review based
on platform community guidelines.29 Human review of all posts by staff
21. Number of social network users in the United States from 2017 to 2026,
STATISTA (Jan. 28, 2022), https://www.statista.com/statistics/278409/number-of-socialnetwork-users-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/L6J8-YXZR].
22. Number includes users from Germany, the United Kingdom, France ,
Italy, Spain, Poland, Ukraine, Netherlands, and Belgium. Number of monthly active
mobile social media users in Europe as of January 2021, by country, STATISTA (Jan 28,
2022), https://www.statista.com/statistics/299496/active-mobile-social-media-users-ineuropean-countries/ [https://perma.cc/YJ23-9U6M].
23. Paige Cooper, All the Social Media Apps You Should Know in 2021, HOOTSUITE
(May 17, 2021), https://blog.hootsuite.com/best-social-media-apps-list [https://perma.cc/
S3HT-AKMF].
24. David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical
Study of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act,
43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 389 (2010).
25. Facebook by the Numbers: Stats, Demographics & Fun Facts, OMNICORE (Oct. 28,
2020), https://www.omnicoreagency.com/facebookstatistics/#:~:text=350%20million%
20photos%20are%20uploaded,300%2C000%20users%20helping%20in%20translation
[https://perma.cc/UJ8Z-FLCG].
26. Susan Wojcicki, YouTube at 15: My Personal Journey and the Road Ahead,
YOUTUBE O FF. BLOG (Feb. 14, 2020), https://blog.youtube/news-and-events/youtubeat-15-my-personal-journey [https://perma.cc/JD7T-F35X].
27. Twitter Usage Statistics, INTERNET LIVE S TATS , https://www.internetlive
stats.com/twitter-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/47R4-VERY].
28. Abbey Stemler, Regulation 2.0: The Marriage of New Governance and Lex
Informatica, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH L. 87, 105–07 (2016).
29. Christopher Gao, Social Media Censorship, Free Speech, and the Super Apps,
CAL. L. REV. BLOG (Oct. 2020), https://www.californialawreview.org/social-mediacensorship-free-speech [https://perma.cc/M25N-E8VS].
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members is impossible, given the size and exponentially increasing scope
of the amount of posts.30 Even with the specialized industry algorithms,
companies struggle to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate
content.31
An algorithm is a set of instructions and rules created to give a computer
the ability to perform a specific task or solve a specific problem.32 Social
media algorithms are proprietary information and individualized to each
company, which varies how each platform undertakes the task of contentfiltering. Content-filtering refers to software that screens and blocks online
content that includes particular words or images.33 The software includes
blocked and buzzword lists created in two ways: human review and automated
selection.34 Human review consists of humans going through websites,
searching for objectionable material and words commonly associated with
such material (i.e. racial slurs, sexist phrases), and adding them to the software,
while automated selection builds off those inputs, constantly updating
itself with similar keywords.35
Algorithms have advantages and disadvantages in content-moderation.
Algorithms are advantageous in showing relevant ads and suggesting similar
content to users all based on the users’ preferences and behaviors analyzed
through machine-learning.36 Also, social media algorithms help companies
flag potentially problematic content for removal.37 But algorithms are

30. The previous paragraph illustrates this point. Using Twitter tweets as an
example, having a team of human reviewers attempting to review 500 million tweets per
day is not cost effective. The number of employees needed to complete a single day’s review
of tweets could not be sustained long-term.
31. Mark Scott & Laura Kayali, What Happened When Humans Stopped Managing
Social Media Content, POLITICO (Oct. 21, 2020, 5:56 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/
facebook-content-moderation-automation/ [https://perma.cc/VPU2-7B5X].
32. Veronica Appia, What is an algorithm and how is it used by big tech?,
TORONTO.COM (Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.toronto.com/news-story/10283678-what-isan-algorithm-and-how-is-it-used-by-big-tech-/ [https://perma.cc/U2XZ-ZAAP].
33. Norman Clark, Content Filter, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/technology/
content-filter [https://perma.cc/Y36K-U2YV].
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Appia, supra note 32.
37. YouTube Community Guidelines enforcement: Videos removed, by source of
first detection, GOOGLE TRANSPARENCY REP., https://transparencyreport.google.com/you
tube-policy/removals?hl=en [https://perma.cc/VW93-26EQ]. 9,321,948 videos were removed
from YouTube from October 2020 through December 2020, with 8,800,082 of those
removed videos being flagged automatically by algorithm. Id. Flags can come from the automated
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disadvantageous as well. As with all things, a healthy level of skepticism
is warranted when using algorithms. Many people are unaware of the
underlying algorithms that work behind-the-scenes of social media.38 If
people think what they see on their feed is “news,” instead of content that
is curated specifically for them, as well as only engage with people that
have similar beliefs, this creates a content bubble—an online space which
only reinforces their beliefs.39 These bubbles create higher levels of engagement
amongst users interacting with the platform content, and the bubbles are
directly related to profit-maximizing algorithms of the platforms.40 The
bubble leads to negative effects such as political polarization and limiting
exposure to diverse views.41
Moreover, using algorithms repeatedly and pervasively over large
populations of people may inappropriately associate risky or otherwise
undesirable content with people’s accounts, imposing unjustified burdens
and hardships on populations, and reinforcing existing inequalities.42 For
example, in early 2019, news broke that YouTube was recommending
explicit self-harm videos with titles like “my huge extreme self-harm scars”
and search terms like “how to self-harm tutorial” to its users, many of
flagging systems, from members of the Trusted Flagger program (NGOs, government
agencies, and individuals) or from users in the broader YouTube community. Id.
38. Emilie Robichaud, How Social Media Algorithms Drive Political Polarization,
MEDIUM: THE STARTUP (Oct. 8, 2020), https://medium.com/swlh/how-persuasive-algorithmsdrive-political-polarization-75819854c11d [https://perma.cc/AU6A-5KHW].
39. Id.
40. Michelle Hampson, Smart Algorithm Bursts Social Networks’ “Filter Bubbles”,
IEEE SPECTRUM (Jan. 21, 2021), https://spectrum.ieee.org/finally-a-means-for-burstingsocial-media-bubbles [https://perma.cc/AA7R-5E9T].
41. Robichaud, supra note 38. See also Wendy Rose Gould, Are you in a Social
Media Bubble? Here Is How to Tell, NBC N EWS (Oct. 21, 2019, 10:06 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/better/lifestyle/problem-social-media-reinforcement-bubbleswhat-you-can-do-about-ncna1063896 [https://perma.cc/4BTK-659L] (“Social media giants —
including Google, Facebook and Twitter—use algorithms that are ever-changing and top
secret, which ultimately create filter bubbles.” “The reality is that all platforms now
constantly feed us content that aligns with our own interests, friends and belief systems.”
“[Platforms] are able to take what we browse or post about and feed us back our own
thoughts gathered from other social media followers as though we have hundreds and
thousands of friends feeling the same way.”).
42. Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private
Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1167
(2018) [hereinafter Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society]. For this Article, an
individual being treated as risky or otherwise undesirable means the individual is selected
by the platforms’ algorithm for being socially taboo (i.e., encouraging suicide or suicidal
inclinations) and as a result those posts are removed or negatively impacted (i.e., removal
of partial clips or sound bites). Unjustified burdens and hardships refer to individuals who
rely on social media as their income source and suffer by having a video that the
individuals invested time and potentially money into to be wrongly flagged and removed,
preventing the individuals from receiving monetary benefits from the removal or censorship.
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whom were young children.43 YouTube responded to the crisis by deleting
the original accounts encouraging self-harm as the accounts violated the
community guidelines against suicide and self-injury, and suspended
comments encouraging self-harm, but some felt this did not address the
core problem: the platform’s use of artificially intelligent algorithms built
to maximize engagement metrics44 above all else.45 The reference algorithm
treated the young children as having a tendency to harm themselves,
enveloping the children in negative content bubbles, exposing young children
to significant traumatic emotional material, all autonomously. 46 This is an
extreme example, but it reinforces the real threat concerning platform
algorithms trapping users in content-bubbles.
The current content moderation algorithms implemented by social media
companies are imperfect tools for content regulation.47 The algorithms are
imperfect in the sense that these algorithms block more lawful speech than
the social media companies wish, and are incapable of exercising human
judgment.48 For example, algorithms can identify certain flagged words
or phrases (i.e., “gay,” “crime,” “abuse”),49 but they are unable to determine
whether the speech in fact defames others or invades an individual’s
privacy.50 When it comes to handling internet defamation issues and other
online reputation attacks—specifically in terms of removing the content

43. Daniyal Malik, YouTube Faces Severe Criticism For Recommending Self Harm
Videos Again, DIGIT. INFO. WORLD (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.digitalinformationworld.
com/2019/02/youtube-recommending-self-harm-videos-in-search-results-criticized.html
[https:// perma.cc/7VR5-6HR5].
44. Engagement metrics measure how much and how often the audience accounts
are interacting with other accounts. Examples of these metrics are likes, comments, and
shares. Jenn Chen, The most important social media metrics to track, SPROUTSOCIAL (Mar.
26, 2021), https://sproutsocial.com/insights/social-media-metrics/ [https://perma.cc/
V4SU-HZU2].
45. Allison Zakon, Optimized for Addiction: Extending Product Liability Concepts
to Defectively Designed Social Media Algorithms and Overcoming the Communications
Decency Act, 20 WIS. L. REV. 1107, 1110 (2020).
46. See Malik, supra note 43.
47. Ardia, supra note 24, at 390.
48. Ardia, supra note 24, at 390.
49. Lindsay Dodgson, YouTubers have identified a long list of words that immediately
get videos demonetized, and they include ‘gay’ and ‘lesbian’ but not ‘straight’ or
‘heterosexual’ (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.insider.com/youtubers-identify-title-words-that-getvideos-demonetized-experiment-2019-10 [https://perma.cc/UE5W-LLPV].
50. Ardia, supra note 24, at 390.
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from the internet—the solutions are, in two words: fact dependent.51 There is
no perfect solution that can be applied to every instance of online defamation.52
Such determinations require contextual analysis and additional fact
gathering.53 As a result, the process of assessing legal liability cannot be
currently solved by algorithmic flagging of words or phrases.54
Regarding content-removal, when an algorithm does remove a post, a
significant factor for the fate of the removed content is whether the post
is controversial. Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube all have appeal processes
for users appealing their removal of content.55 Facebook is the first platform
to create an external and independent appeal process for removed material.
In November 2018, Facebook announced the construction of an independent
oversight body, the Facebook Oversight Board (“FOB”).56 The FOB’s
purpose is to serve as an appellate review system for user content and
to make content-moderation policy recommendations to Facebook.57 It seeks
to grant transparency to Facebook’s internal deliberations in deciding
how to design and implement the FOB.58
Facebook admits it does not “always get it right” when it decides to take
something down, which is why they created the FOB.59 The FOB independently
reviews some of the most difficult and significant content decisions
Facebook makes.60 Facebook stipulates users can appeal removed posts to

51. Whitney Gibson, Removing Internet Defamation From the Internet: Solutions
are Fact-Dependent, VORYS (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.vorys.com/publications-1673.
html [https://perma.cc/74EV-UQ7R].
52. Id.
53. Ardia, supra note 24, at 390.
54. Ardia, supra note 24, at 390–91.
55. Stan Horaczek, Here’s What You Can Do If Your Social Media Post Gets Taken
Down, POPULAR SCI. (July 20, 2018), https://www.popsci.com/appeal-social-media-posttakedowns [https://perma.cc/5RLX-YPC8]. Twitter follows a multi-level system depending on
the severity of the violation and frequency of violations regarding their standards, including
Tweet-Level Enforcement, Direct-Level Message Enforcement, or Account-Level
Enforcement. Our Range Of Enforcement Options, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/
rules-and-policies/enforcement-options [https://perma.cc/7TAV-HEV8]. YouTube only
allows a single appeal on removals based on Community Guidelines, where a human
reviews the removed post and determines whether to reinstate the post or keep the post
removed. Appeal Community Guidelines Actions, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/
youtube/answer/185111?hl=en [https://perma.cc/VFP4-G5NT]. The approaches are substantially
similar across the US and the EU.
56. Kate Klonick, The Facebook Oversight Board: Creating an Independent
Institution to Adjudicate Online Free Expression, 129 YALE L.J. 2418, 2418 (2020).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2425–26.
59. What is the Oversight Board?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/
711867306096893?helpref=related&ref=related&source_cms_id=3463664531159 [https://
perma.cc/PV2V-ACAE].
60. Id.
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its new Oversight Board if Facebook has taken down the content and
already upheld a human review finding that a post was a violation of
the Community Standards.61 Section IV will go into greater analysis
concerning the significance of the FOB and what it means for creating
other oversight boards to deter viewpoint discrimination by granting greater
transparency.
It is wise for platforms to err on the side of blocking controversial posts
to save face and protect revenue streams. From the platform’s perspective,
it costs less to remove expressive—yet problematic—posts rather than
risking damage to the website’s reputation.62 Recalling the YouTube selfharm example, YouTube experienced severe negative pressure in the
media and even though YouTube did not intend to promote self-harm to
children, its underlying goals of profit and reputation remained constant,
evidenced by YouTube instantly removing the accounts after the complaints
by users, to salvage its reputation and ease its users’ outrage. 63 Social
media companies are for-profit businesses that prioritize profits and tenaciously
protect their bottom line, which naturally leads to preemptively avoiding
any issues by removing controversial content before profit margins
suffer.64
B. The Inverted Triangle of Social Media Content Regulation
Social media content moderation concerning speech involves balancing
relationships between platforms, governments, and users, best understood
when thought of as an inverted triangle.65 In this inverted triangle, there
61. Id.
62. See generally Ardia, supra note 24, at 391.
63. Malik, supra note 43.
64. David L. Hudson, Jr., Free Speech or Censorship? Social Media Litigation is a
Hot Legal Battleground, ABA J. (Apr. 1, 2019, 12:05 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/
magazine/article/social-clashes-digital-free-speech [https://perma.cc/9GM3-H63K].
65. Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011, 2014-15
(2018) (“On one corner of the triangle are nation-states, states, municipalities, and
supranational organizations like the European Union. On the second corner of the triangle
are internet-infrastructure companies. These include social media companies . . . search
engines, internet service providers (ISPs) . . . the internet infrastructure is important, if not
crucial, to people’s practical ability to speak. In most countries, this internet infrastructure,
or important parts of it, are privately owned. On the third corner of the triangle, at the very
bottom, we have speakers and legacy media, including mass-media organizations, protesters,
civil-society organizations, hackers, and trolls. Although both states and infrastructure
owners regulate their speech, they are sometimes able to influence states and infrastructure
owners through social activism and protest.”).
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are the top two points: (1) the social media company, and (2) the relevant
governmental body. Both points taper downward, exerting pressure on the
last point—those in the user role like individuals, associations, and commercial
companies.66 The two top points hold power over the expression of the
bottom.67
FIGURE 1
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The above diagram illustrates the relationships at play in content regulation.68
Social media companies regulate users’ speech through private administrative
practices like Terms of Service and privacy policies, while the government
regulates speakers through fines, penalties, imprisonment, or other forms
of punishment. 69 The top two points of the triangle connect through
additional restrictions that governments implement on social media companies,
vicariously impacting the expression of the speakers at the bottom of the
triangle.70
An example of extreme government regulation on social platforms is
demonstrated by China, which implements a strategy known as the “Great
Firewall” to regulate internet access by criminalizing non-government

66. Id. at 2014–15.
67. Id.
68. Figure 1 is an original chart based entirely on illustrating Balkin’s theory of the
three aspects of free speech forming a triangle. See id.
69. Id. at 2015, 2021.
70. Id. at 1187–89.
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approved material posted on available platforms.71 China’s internet users
have less freedom of expression due to the government’s stricter policies
regarding what the speakers may post—the policies tighten the sides
of the triangle and shrink the freedom of expression area within the
triangle.72 Thus, more restrictions on content lead to a smaller triangle of
expression for speakers, while removing restrictions creates a larger triangle
and more room for speakers to express themselves.73
Likewise, the more regulations social media platforms enforce, the less
power the speakers have over expressing themselves. The inverted
triangle, though a great starting visual, is not sufficient for understanding
all complications of private companies censoring content that constitutes
users’ freedom of expression.74
C. The First Amendment, Viewpoint Discrimination, and the Hurdle of
Social Media Companies Being Private Entities
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or the press,”75 however, First Amendment
speech protection is generally not extended to private company selfregulation.76 The major social media organizations—Facebook, YouTube,
and Twitter—are private companies.77 Just as the New York Times, CNN, or
any other traditional media platform has no obligation to host a particular

71. Christopher Stevenson, Breaching the Great Firewall: China’s Internet Censorship and
the Quest for Freedom of Expression in a Connected World, 30 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 531, 538 (2007).
72. Dennis Normal, Science Suffers as China’s Internet Censors Plug Holes in Great
Firewall, S CIENCE (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.science.org/content/article/sciencesuffers-china-s-internet-censors-plug-holes-great-firewall [https://perma.cc/ARP9-57LN].
Elaborating on China’s stricter policies regarding what the speakers may post, China
reportedly has 50,000 internet police who monitor domestic social media sites, deleting
posts deemed seditious or merely critical of the government. Id. Numerous research sites
are also blocked, including Google Scholar which is important for scholarly, Google Docs
and Dropbox, which allow scientists to share materials for organizing conferences and
managing collaborations, and even the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Id.
73. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society, supra note 42, at 1187–89.
74. Hudson, supra note 64.
75. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
76. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1926 (2019).
77. Nadine Strossen, Does the First Amendment Apply to Social Media Companies,
TALKSONLAW, https://www.talksonlaw.com/briefs/does-the-first-amendment-requiresocial-media-platforms-to-grant-access-to-all-users [https://perma.cc/8D9V-35BR].
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message, the same is true for social media organizations. 78 The terms
“freedom of speech,” “freedom of expression,” and “freedom of the press”
are treated equally in United States jurisprudence.79 Therefore, freedom
of speech and freedom of expression shall be used interchangeably and
signify the same legal doctrines when referring to users’ speech or how
users went about expressing themselves.
The Supreme Court consistently interprets the First Amendment’s
protections to extend to individual and collective speech “in pursuit of a
wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and
cultural ends.”80 Therefore, speech is generally protected under the First
Amendment unless it falls within one of the narrow categories of unprotected
speech, which are obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, fighting words,
true threats, speech integral to criminal conduct, and child pornography.81
Whether courts apply strict scrutiny or a lower form of scrutiny depends
on the character and context of the speech.82 If the restriction is contentbased, meaning the restriction discriminates against speech based on the
substance of what it communicates, then strict scrutiny will be applied,
and if the restriction is content-neutral, then a lower standard of scrutiny
may be applicable.83 At issue here is viewpoint discrimination, which is
content-based in nature.
Political and ideological restrictions on speech receive strict scrutiny by
the courts.84 The Supreme Court considers political and ideological speech to
be at the core of the First Amendment, including speech concerning
“politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.”85 Political

78. Id.
79. First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 732, 799 (1978).
80. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
81. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., The First Amendment: Categories of Speech, (Jan. 16,
2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF11072.pdf (noting the limited categories of speech
that the government may regulate because of the speech’s content, if the government regulates
it evenhandedly); see R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–88 (1992) (identifying these
unprotected speech categories as obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, fighting words,
true threats, speech integral to criminal conduct, and child pornography).
82. Identifying the category of speech at issue (e.g., commercial speech, obscenity)
is an important step in determining what First Amendment standards, including what level
of judicial scrutiny, a court might apply to the law. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 81,
at 1. Regulations of protected speech generally receive strict or intermediate scrutiny,
which are high bars for the government to meet. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 81, at
1. In contrast, the government typically has more leeway to regulate unprotected speech.
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 81, at 1.
83. David L. Hudson Jr., Content Based, THE FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA,
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/935/content-based [https://perma.cc/
4V27-Z7SU].
84. Id.
85. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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speech can also take other forms beyond writing or words, such as symbolic
acts.86 A government regulation that implicates political, or ideological
speech generally receives strict scrutiny in the courts, where the government
must show that the law is “narrowly tailored” to achieve “a compelling
government interest.”87
A form of content-based discrimination at the level of strict scrutiny is
viewpoint discrimination. Viewpoint discrimination is an “egregious”
form of content-based discrimination.88 When the government targets not
subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the
violation of the First Amendment is “all the more blatant.”89 The government
must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology
or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the
restriction.90 The test for viewpoint discrimination is “whether—within the
relevant subject category—the government has singled out a subset of
messages for disfavor based on the views expressed.”91
Further clarification of viewpoint discrimination is found in Matal v.
Tam.92 The Supreme Court in Matal explained that although viewpoint
discriminatory conduct targeting offensive speech may be evenhanded
and apply to multiple, allegedly offensive viewpoints or speakers, the
First Amendment forbids any attempt to ban all offensive speech because
“[g]iving offense is a viewpoint.”93 In its ruling, the Supreme Court emphasized
that the First Amendment’s prohibition against viewpoint discrimination

86. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412–14 (1989) (holding criminal conviction
for burning the American flag violated the defendant’s First Amendment rights because
the defendant burning the flag qualified as political expression and the state lacked findings of
that action breaching the peace during the demonstration).
87. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 783
(2007).
88. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1750 (2017); see also Boos, 485 U.S. at 316
(offering an example of a viewpoint-based regulation found to be discriminatory on its
face). In Boos, the Supreme Court struck down a District of Columbia statute that
criminalized the display of any sign criticizing a foreign government within five hundred
feet of its embassy. Id. On its face, this statute was viewpoint discriminatory because it
singled out one particular perspective—criticism of foreign governments—for suppression. Id.
at 319.
92. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1744.
93. Id. at 1763.

429

SCHEURMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/10/2022 9:38 AM

is central to an understanding of First Amendment protections.94 The
Supreme Court states that the law protects offensive, even “hateful” speech:
“Speech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age,
disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of
our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express
even ‘the thought that we hate.’”95
However, the First Amendment does not extend to private companies
prohibiting user expression.96 Private companies are private actors, not
governmental bodies, and the Supreme Court of the United States interprets
the free-speech clause of the First Amendment to constrain only governmental
actors, not private actors.97 To draw the line between governmental and
private actors, the Supreme Court applies the state-action doctrine.98
Under the state-action doctrine, a private entity may only be considered a
state actor when it “exercises a function traditionally exclusively reserved
to the State.”99
The Court finds private entities to qualify as state actors scarcely, an
example being in a 1946 case named Marsh v. Alabama.100 In Marsh, the
Court held that a privately owned town made itself equivalent to public
property, and could not stop a Jehovah’s witness from passing out religious
flyers on the streets of the town because the operation of the town
constituted state action.101 Therefore, defeating viewpoint discrimination
perpetrated by platforms through the First Amendment’s state-action doctrine
is not likely to succeed without modification to the current governing law,
47 U.S.C. Section 230.102

94. Kathleen M. Hidy, Social Media Use And Viewpoint Discrimination: A First
Amendment Judicial Tightrope Walk With Rights And Risks Hanging In The Balance, 102
MARQ. L. Rev. 1045, 1055 (2019).
95. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1764 (quoting Justice Holmes in United States v. Schwimmer,
279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
96. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 1926.
97. Id. (operation of a public access channel held insufficient to establish the role
of an entity as a government actor).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1928.
100. See generally Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506–09 (1946) (Court held that
a privately owned town made itself equivalent to public property and could not stop a
Jehovah’s witness from passing out religious flyers because operation of the town
constituted state action). However, the Supreme Court has limited this ruling. See also
Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 1921.
101. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 503, 509–10.
102. Hudson, supra note 64.
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III. APPLICABLE LAWS REGARDING SOCIAL MEDIA CONTENT
REMOVAL IN THE US AND THE EU
A. US Section 230’s Social Media Company Safe Harbor
Online intermediary liability regarding user posted content in the United
States is governed by the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”),
codified as 47 U.S.C. § 230 (“Section 230”).103 The relevant statutory language
of Section 230 is the “Good Samaritan” provision, which is the authority
surrounding civil liability of companies publishing and regulating thirdparty content on the internet.104 There are two prongs to this well-known
statute. The first prong, (c)(1), stipulates “no . . . interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider.”105 Essentially, (c)(1) prevents
civil liability arising from posts social media companies allow on their
websites by preventing the companies from being construed as the party
creating (or “publishing”) the post, despite the companies allowing circulation
of the post.
The second prong, (c)(2), states no “interactive computer service” shall
be held liable on account of:
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability
of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not
such material is constitutionally protected; or

103. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) for further policy considerations underlying implementing
section 230 (“It is the policy of the United States—
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive
computer services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for
the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal
or State regulation;
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control
over what information is received by individuals, families, and schools who
use the Internet and other interactive computer services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and
filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s access
to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish
trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer.”).
104. Id. § 230(c).
105. Id.

431

SCHEURMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/10/2022 9:38 AM

(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or
others the technical means to restrict access to material described.106

Thus, (c)(2) sets forth immunity for “interactive computer service[s]”
(social media companies) that shields these companies from civil liability
regarding content regulation of “information content provider[s]” (users).107
Simplified, (c)(2) enables platforms—or any company that meets the definition
of “interactive computer service” under Section 230—to freely takedown
or leave up any post, without civil liability, subject to two large exceptions.108
The two broadest categories of Section 230’s exceptions are intellectual
property claims and criminal prosecutions, which do not receive the
immunity provided in section (c).109 This is significant, for platforms that
do not remove material that either violates intellectual property laws or
material deemed criminal are exposed to liability for failure to remove
those posts. Prior to Section 230’s enactment in 1996, issues regarding
liability centered around whether to treat interactive computer services as
publishers or speakers.110
Then in 1997, one year after Section 230’s enactment, the United States
Supreme Court ruled on Reno v. ACLU.111 In Reno, the Court reviewed
sections of the CDA attempting to criminalize the communication via the
internet of “indecent” and “patently offensive” content to any person under 18
years old.112 The “patently offensive” and “indecent” material restrictions
were struck down, failing the strict scrutiny standard, placing unacceptably
106. Id. (emphasis added to demonstrate broad language given to platforms in their
content regulation capabilities).
107. Id. § 230(f)(3); Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civ. Rights Under the Law, Inc. v.
Craigslist, Inc., 461 F.Supp.2d 681, 693 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“Section 230(c)(1) . . . bars those
causes of action that would require treating interactive computer services as publisher of
third-party content”), aff’d, 519 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2008).
108. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c); 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (“Interactive computer service”
means “any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or
enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a
service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services
offered by libraries or educational institutions.”).
109. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e).
110. See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, 776 F. Supp. 135, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(holding that Compuserve was a distributor and not liable for defamatory statements made
by a third party because Compuserve had no reason to know of the defamatory statement
at issue); see also Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 at 5
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (holding that Prodigy was subject to liability of defamatory statements made
by a third party because Prodigy exercised some control over moderation of posts).
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. disincentivized online computer services regulation of content
because any regulation could open regulators to third-party liability as a publisher. Stratton
Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710 at 5; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2018) (for policy
purposes of Section 230’s enactment).
111. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 844 (1997).
112. Id. at 849.
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heavy burdens on protected speech, and were insufficient for the “narrow
tailoring” needed to justify the restrictions on freedom of speech.113 The
underlying rationale of the Court focused on the overbroad content-based
restrictions of free speech.114 Lastly, the Court declared its stance on internet
censorship, stating, “encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic
society outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship.”115
Reno demonstrates the Supreme Court’s view on online material,
granting online material the same degree of protection as public speech to
facilitate the exchange of ideas.116 Also, the Court is cautious of censorship,
believing the ability to censor anything to individuals under eighteen years
of age is untenable, given that “most Internet forums are open to all comers”
and that even the strictest reading of the “indecent materials” requirement
would “confer broad powers of censorship, in the form of a ‘heckler’s
veto,’ upon any opponent of indecent speech.”117
Since 1997, Section 230 has been used as a sturdy shield for platforms
to numerous claims. A model example is the D.C. Circuit case Klayman
v. Zuckerberg, where the court held Section 230 prevented tort liability
based on Facebook’s decisions to allow or to remove content from its
website.118 Additionally, the court held a social networking website does
not create or develop content by merely providing “a neutral means by
which third parties can post information of their own independent choosing
online.”119
The current practical applications of Section 230 are once again exemplified
in the Ninth Circuit case of Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc.120 The Barnes case
centers around whether the CDA protects an “internet service provider”
from suit where it attempted to remove harmful material—nude photographs
of the plaintiff and ex-boyfriend defendant on a shared Yahoo public
profile—from its website, but failed to do so.121 The court held the CDA
does protect against such suit, allowing Yahoo to invoke Section 230’s
immunity. The court reasoned that:

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 882–83.
Id. at 880–82.
Id. at 885.
Id. at 884.
Id. at 880.
Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1358.
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101–02 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1098.
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What matters is not the name of the cause of action—defamation versus negligence
versus intentional infliction of emotional distress—what matters is whether the
cause of action inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as the “publisher
or speaker” of content provided by another. To put it another way, courts must ask
whether the duty that the plaintiff alleges the defendant violated derives from the
defendant’s status or conduct as a “publisher or speaker.” If it does, section 230(c)(1)
precludes liability.122

The court also stated “(c)(2) also protects Internet service providers from
liability not for publishing or speaking, but rather for actions taken to restrict
access to obscene or otherwise objectionable content.” 123 The phrase
“otherwise objectionable content” serves as the statutory catch-all enabling
censorship power, while the private company status—combined with terms
and conditions contracts—adds additional strength to the social media
platforms’ right to censor content.124
Section 230 has been successfully invoked in cases involving negligence,
deceptive trade practices, unfair competition, false advertising, commonlaw privacy torts, tortious interference with contract or business relations,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and dozens of other legal
doctrines.125 Yet, the future of Section 230 is uncertain.126 Emphasizing
the antiquated nature of the legislation, Section 230 was enacted in 1996,
with the only update to the statute being added in 2018 regarding the safe
harbor not covering websites “that promote and facilitate prostitution.”127
For reference, Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter opened their platforms to
the public in 2004, 2005, and 2006.128 Since 1996, social media’s influence
over society has exponentially grown—as well as the amount of content
the platforms restrict—with no meaningful update to the governing statute.129
122. Id. at 1101-02 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230).
123. Id. at 1105.
124. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
125. See Eric Goldman, How Section 230 Enhances the First Amendment, AM.
CONST. SOC’Y (July 28, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3662475/
[perma.cc/CV98-H4R2].
126. See Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (May 28, 2020). The order is
titled “Preventing Online Censorship,” and the order specifically states that Facebook,
YouTube, and Twitter are “engaging in selective censorship that is h arming our national
discourse” and instructs the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Attorney
General, and acting through the National Telecommunications and Information Administration,
to file a petition for rulemaking with the Federal Communications Commission requesting
that the FCC expeditiously propose regulations to changed Section 230(c). Id.
127. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 230 notes (“[S]ection 230 . . . was never intended to
provide legal protection to websites that unlawfully promote and facilitate prostitution and
websites that facilitate traffickers in advertising the sale of unlawful sex acts with sex
trafficking victims.”).
128. The History of Social Media: A Timeline, P HRASEE (Aug. 6, 2018), https://
phrasee.co/the-history-of-social-media-a-timeline/ [perma.cc/34KS-4KX7].
129. See generally Kemp, supra note 18.
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Hence, social media platforms’ overbroad discretion over choice of removal
of user posts must be scrutinized.
B. The EU’s Lesser Freedom of Expression, the E-Commerce
Directive and Content Regulation
The EU has less expression available for platform users than the US. In
the EU, the governing legislation on freedom of expression is the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights, which establishes every individual has the
right to freedom of expression.130 However, this right to expression is
limited by “formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed
by law.”131 These “formalities” and “conditions” refer to the individual
governance of the Member States of the EU.132 Additionally, there is a
lower standard level of expression in the EU than the US. For example,
the EU outlaws hate speech, while the US jurisprudence protects it.133
In application, the lower standard of expression impacts platforms
under the EU’s domain. For example, in 2017, Germany, a Member State
of the EU and a country with some of the strictest laws on what is acceptable
speech, passed the Network Enforcement Act (“NetzDG”).134 The NetzDG
requires social media platforms like Facebook to quickly take down illegal
material (i.e., comments inciting hatred against national, religious, ethnic
or racial groups) or face large fines.135 Thus, the EU provides less protection
for expression of social media users than the United States.136
The EU has its own laws concerning social media content regulation
and liability. The EU’s governing law concerning online intermediary liability

130. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 21, Oct. 26, 2012,
2012 O.J. (C 326/02) [hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union].
131. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
132. Id.
133. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1764; Online Platforms’ Moderation of Illegal Content
Online Law, Practices and Options for Reform, EUR. PARL. DOC. (PE 652.718) (2020).
134. Netzdurchsetzunggesetz, [NetzDG][Network Enforcement Act], Sept. 1, 2017,
BGBL I at 3352 (Ger.), https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=1245 [perma.cc/3L4QXXC2].
135. Janosch Delcker, Germany’s Balancing Act: Fighting Online Hate While Protecting
Free Speech, POLITICO (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-hatespeech-internet-netzdg-controversial-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/9GRC-E8KU].
136. See Kitsuron Sangsuvan, Balancing Freedom of Speech on the Internet Under
International Law, 39 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 701, 716 (2014).
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is the E-commerce Directive, enacted in 2000.137 The E-commerce Directive
grants safe harbor for three types of online intermediaries who host or
transmit content provided by third parties. 138 The three types of online
intermediaries covered under the safe harbor are (1) Mere Conduit Service
Providers, (2) Caching Providers, and (3) Hosting Providers.139 Social
media companies like Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter are considered
hosting providers under the E-commerce Directive.140
Hosting providers must meet two requirements to qualify for safe
harbor.141 First, hosting providers cannot be held liable without “actual
knowledge” of illegal activity or information when unaware of facts or
circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent.142
What constitutes “illegal activity,” however, has not been precisely defined
in the E-commerce Directive.143 Second, hosting providers must also “act
expeditiously to remove” (take down) or to “disable access” (block) illegal
activity or information of which they have obtained actual knowledge.144
The main tools used by EU online platforms to identify illegal content
online are “notice-and-takedown” flags used by users, keywords or filters,
and AI machine learning models.145 All large online platforms allow users
to appeal against their decisions on the moderation of illegal content
online through a “counter-notice” procedure.146Additionally, Article 15 of
the E-commerce Directive enables Member States of the EU to impose
additional obligations on internet service providers to report “alleged
illegal activities,” such as the previously discussed NetzDG legislation.147
Although “illegal activity” has not been precisely defined in the ECommerce Directive, the EU consistently finds four types of content
illegal: (1) child sexual abuse material; (2) racist and xenophobic hate
speech; (3) terrorist content; and (4) content infringing on intellectual
property rights.148 Online intermediaries can be subject to injunctive relief

137. Council Directive 2000/31, supra note 14.
138. Council Directive 2000/31, supra note 14.
139. Council Directive 2000/31, supra note 14, art. 12–14.
140. Council Directive 2000/31, supra note 14, art. 14.
141. Council Directive 2000/31, supra note 14, art. 14.
142. Council Directive 2000/31, supra note 14, art. 14.
143. Council Directive 2000/31, supra note 14, art. 14.
144. Council Directive 2000/31, supra note 14, art. 14.
145. Online Platforms’ Moderation of Illegal Content Online: Law, Practices and
Options for Reform, EUR. PARL. DOC. PE 652.718 (2020).
146. Id. The counter-notice is accessible through a link on the blocked-content and
allows for users to manually type their requests for reinstatement of the post and the
contents of the post. Id.
147. Council Directive 2000/31, supra note 14, art. 15.
148. Online Platforms’ Moderation of Illegal Content Online Law, Practices and
Options for Reform, EUR. PARL. DOC. PE 652.718, 16–17 (2020).
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when they are found to be in breach of any piece of specific legislation
regarding the previously listed areas, such as copyright law.149
An illustrative case of the application of the E-Commerce Directive is
Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Ltd.150 Ms. Glawischnig-Piesczek
was a member of the Nationalrat (National Council, Austria), chair of the
parliamentary party “die Grünen” (The Greens) and federal spokesperson
for that party.151 On April 3, 2016, a Facebook user shared on their own
personal page an article from an Austrian online news magazine titled “Greens:
Minimum income for refugees should stay,” which included a photograph
of Glawischnig-Piesczek.152 The user also published, in connection with
that article, comments which the Supreme Court of Austria found to be
harmful to the reputation of Glawischnig-Piesczek by insulting and
defaming her.153
The comments called Glawischnig-Piesczek “miese Volksverräterin”
(lousy traitor), “korrupten Trampel” (corrupt bumpkin), and her party a
“Faschistenpartei” (fascist party).154 Glawischnig-Piesczek requested that
Facebook Ireland delete the comments, but Facebook Ireland refused.155
This led her to bring an action before the Commercial Court of Vienna in
Austria which ordered Facebook Ireland to cease from publishing and
disseminating photographs showing Glawischnig-Piesczek if the accompanying
text contained the assertions—verbatim or using words with equivalent
meaning—of the comments at issue.156 Facebook Ireland then appealed to
the Supreme Court of Austria.157
The Supreme Court of Austria referred the question to the Court of
Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”), asking whether Article 15(1) of
the Directive required hosting providers to remove not only illegal
information within the meaning of Article 14(1)(a) of the Directive, but

149. Reform of the EU Liability Regime For Online Intermediaries, EUR. PARL. DOC.
PE 649.404, 3 (2020).
150. Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:
2019:821.
151. Id. ¶ 10.
152. Id. ¶ 12.
153. Id.
154. Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Limited, GLOB. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
COLUM. UNIV., https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/glawischnigpiesczek-v-facebook-ireland-limited/ [https://perma.cc/3BXN-J8LG].
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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also other identically worded, or equivalent meaning information.158 The
CJEU held the Directive did not preclude a Member state from ordering a
hosting provider to remove information found to be unlawful, as well as
information that is identical or equivalent to such unlawful information
posted by any user.159 The CJEU’s reasoning included referencing Article
14(1) of the Directive, which exempts information service providers from
liability if they have (1) no knowledge of any illegal activity or information,
and once obtaining “actual knowledge” of illegal activity, (2) act “expeditiously
to remove or disable access to the information” immediately.160 Facebook
Ireland was notified of the illegal content, but failed to “expeditiously”
remove or disable access to the defamatory content, precluding Facebook
Ireland from claiming immunity under the E-Commerce Directive.161
The EU allows Member States and their respective courts to establish
procedures to remove or disable illegal content and require platforms “to
terminate or prevent infringement.”162 Glawischnig-Piesczek extended
this allowance to “information with an equivalent meaning,” as long
as the host is not required to “carry out an independent assessment of that
content,” and only employs automated search tools for the “elements specified
in the injunction.”163 As a result, EU law currently allows, but does not
mandate, the removal of content that is identical, or equivalent to the initial
illegal content already brought to the attention of the social platform. 164
In evaluating the EU’s approach to platform liability for content removal
for possibilities to diminish viewpoint discrimination, the E-Commerce
Directive does not directly address viewpoint discrimination, nor does it
allow a cause of action for social media users against social media companies
that remove lawful content. However, the E-Commerce Directive does
incentivize over-removal of illegal posts. Encouraging over-removal
increases censorship over every viewpoint and prevents viewpoints that
are different than the viewpoints of the company, its advertisers, or the
majority of its users.165
158. Id.; Council Directive 2000/31, supra note 14, art. 13 (“(a) the provider does
not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and, as regards claims for
damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or
information is apparent”).
159. Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:
2019:821, ¶ 53.
160. Id. ¶ 4.
161. Id. ¶ 27.
162. Id. ¶ 4.
163. Id. ¶¶ 39, 41, 45–46.
164. Luc von Danwitz, The Contribution Of Eu Law To The Regulation Of Online
Speech, 27 MICH. TECH. L. REV. 167, 211 (2020).
165. Rikke Frank Jørgensen & Lumi Zuleta, Private Governance of Freedom of
Expression on Social Media Platforms: EU Content Regulation Through The Lens Of
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Moreover, additional requirements are placed on social media companies
by the Audio-Visual Media Services Directive (“AVMSD”) to “take
appropriate measures” to remove illegal content.166 Such “appropriate
measures” include platforms having mechanisms for users to flag non-compliant
content, effective procedures for user complaints, providing effective
media literacy tools, and raising users’ awareness of those tools.167
The AVMSD’s 2018 amendment also notes “social media services”
should be treated as “audiovisual media services” due to both industries
competing for the “same audiences and revenues,” and the “considerable
impact” in the possibility of users shaping and influencing opinions
of other users.168 The 2018 revision further detailed duties of social media
companies, holding the companies responsible for the duty to protect the
general public from the four types of online content illegal under EU law,
elaborating on the definition of hate speech being illegal if based on the
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights—sex, race, color, ethnic or social
origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other
opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability,
age, or sexual orientation.169
Lastly, the revision assigns the responsibility to protect minors from
content which may impair their physical, mental, or moral development.170
These additional duties of care are covered by social media companies
under the AVMSD to the extent that they meet the definition of a videosharing platform service.171

Human Rights Standards, 41 NORDICOM REV. 1, 59 (2020), https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/339682228_Private_Governance_of_Freedom_of_Expression_on_Social
_Media_Platforms [https://perma.cc/PLA8-NV5W]
166. Council Directive 2010/13, art. 4(2)(b)-(3)(a), 2010 O.J. (L 95) 1, 14-15 (EC);
Council Directive 2018/1808, ¶ 4, 2018 O.J. (L 303) 69 (EC) [hereinafter Council
Directive 2018/1808].
167. Council Directive 2018/1808, supra note 166, ¶ 28.
168. Council Directive 2018/1808, supra note 166, ¶ 4.
169. Council Directive 2018/1808, supra note 166, ¶¶ 13, 47; Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, supra note 130, art. 21.
170. Online Platforms’ Moderation of Illegal Content Online: Law, Practices and
Options for Reform, EUR. PARL. DOC. PE 652.718, 24 (2020).
171. Council Directive 2018/1808, supra note 166, ¶ 5 (Defining a video-sharing
platform as “a service offering programmes, user-generated videos, or both, to the general
public, for which the video-sharing platform provider does not have editorial responsibility, in
order to inform, entertain or educate, using electronic communications networks, and the
organisation of which is determined by the video-sharing platform provider, including by
use of automatic means or algorithms, in particular by displaying, tagging and sequencing.”).
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C. Major Key Differences In the US and the EU for Content Removal
Before proceeding with the Section 230 analysis, it is important to note
the major relevant differences in US and EU law pertaining to user expression
and social media content removal practices. First, the EU offers less
protection over freedom of expression than the US.172 Second, the EU’s
social media censorship remedies are based on criminalization, not civil
remedies.173 Nevertheless, the EU serves as Europe’s baseline for online
content moderation, which helps highlight and assess the US’s strengths
and weaknesses in its own current statutory framework. Additionally, the
two approaches share similarities.
A hypothetical scenario will best serve to illustrate the different approaches
to online intermediary liability concerning regulation of user content used
by both the US and the EU. Suppose a social media user posts a string of
content defaming a polarizing political figure on Facebook, YouTube, and
Twitter. The hypothetical post, in part, states “This French bureaucrat is
lining his pockets with baguettes paid for by his citizens’ taxes.” The social
media companies remove this post via their own algorithms for violating
respective guidelines of community standards. Some users, upon viewing
the post, believe the post constituted defamation, and other users felt it
deserved a Pulitzer Prize for displaying a brilliant political message.
Under US law, Section 230 would prevent any civil liability for the
social media companies when removing the posts.174 The liability lies with
the publisher (poster) of the content and not the intermediary platform.175
The user posting on the platform only allows the user to be held responsible
for the post, making the post able to be used against that respective user
in civil and criminal cases while leaving the social media platform out of
the scope of liability.176 There is no successful claim of liability against
the social media companies and their respective censorship. Even if
Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter did not censor the material, the platforms
would not be liable for allowing the content to remain available on their
sites, as (c)(1) blocks any interpretation of the companies being publishers
or speakers of the information.177
Under EU law, social media companies (hosting providers) are not
liable (1) without “actual knowledge” of illegal activity or information when
172. Kalev Leetaru, The EU Will Be The End Of Free Speech Online, FORBES (June
6, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2019/06/06/the-eu-will-be-the-endof-free-speech-online/?sh=132b5ce056a8 [https://perma.cc/8FSS-CNDJ].
173. See Council Directive 2000/31, supra note 14, art. 4.
174. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
175. Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101-02 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230).
176. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
177. Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101-02 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230).
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unaware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or
information is apparent and (2) must also “act expeditiously to remove”
(“take down”) or to “disable access” (“block”) illegal activity or information
of which they have obtained actual knowledge.178 The content, explicitly
referencing French culture negatively (“lining his pockets with baguettes”),
due to its borderline xenophobic nature, would likely be deemed illegal
content.179 Thus, Article 14 of the Directive requires the companies to take
appropriate measures to take it down once notified of its illegality, or be
fined as a result of their inaction.180
In this case, Section 230 protects user expression to a greater degree
than the E-Commerce Directive. The US law grants immunity of civil
liability to the social media intermediary regardless of censorship or not,
while the EU demands the statement, which is illegal, be removed by the
social media intermediary. The contrast highlights the discretionary power
offered to the social media companies in the US, which enables viewpoint
discrimination upon its users.
Increasing civil liability for intermediary social media platforms in the
US would provide the benefit of incentivizing platforms to moderate more
accurately, and to develop more efficient content-filtering approaches.
Adversely, increased liability would also provide the incentive of moderating
strictly and strain companies by requiring more monetary resources towards
review of content restrictions. However, when balancing these two different
sides of the scale, the weight of allowing individuals to express themselves
despite disapproval of the majority or established societal norms must win
out, even if “the idea itself [is] offensive or disagreeable.” 181 A society
that silences disagreement will not be able to grow if it shelters itself from
adversity.
IV. ANALYSIS OF SECTION 230’S DEFICIENCIES REGARDING SOCIAL
MEDIA CONTENT REMOVAL PRACTICES
This section will start with a discussion of Section 230’s allowance
of platforms’ overbroad discretionary authority in the removal of their
content. Next, the section will move on to issues surrounding lack of transparency
with the content removal process. Then, the analysis will turn to viewpoint
178.
179.
180.
181.

Council Directive 2000/31, supra note 14, art. 14.
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 130, art. 21.
Council Directive 2000/31, supra note 14, art. 14.
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414.
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discrimination, examining how platforms are able to viewpoint discriminate
and the political and social ramifications of such behavior.
A. Social Media Companies’ Unique Business Model Creates
Overbroad Discretionary Authority in Content Removal
Social media companies are unique in that their profit originates by
providing a platform for the online speech of others, which entangles their
commercial interests and their governing roles. Under Section 230, overbroad
discretionary power of online intermediaries is exercised by curating online
content; ranking or giving priority to some content, while diverting attention
away from other types of information, leading to content-bubbles.182 These
content-bubbles help foster viewpoint discrimination by reaffirming individual
users’ beliefs without any chance for minority opinions to be introduced.183
But, platforms need some degree of discretionary power to effectively run
their sites. Therefore, a balance must be set between discretionary autonomy
of the platforms to run their own business and the freedom of speech
issues that arise from unrestricted discretion.
Discretionary power is the root of a laissez-faire economy, allowing
companies to adjust to market supply and demand based on their own
decision-making.184 However, online intermediaries are unique in that their
profit originates by providing a platform for the online speech of others—
their own users—which complicates their commercial interests and their
governing roles.185 Permitting social media companies exclusive discretion
over consumer complaints while simultaneously allowing the companies
to control those same consumers is ill-advised. Letting those companies
adjudicate the content they distribute may trap intermediaries in a conflict
of interest.186 The conflict of interest is being placed in a position to grab
one’s cake (user posts), and eat it (profits from user posts), and then blame
someone else that the cake is gone (blame user if the posts are removed
because the posts did not meet guidelines). The platforms review their
own mistakes and have no official consequences for simply ignoring mistakes
made and allowing posts to stay blocked.187
182. Niva Elkin-Koren & Maayan Perel, Guarding the Guardians: Content
Moderation by Online Intermediaries and the Rule of Law, OXFORD H ANDBOOK OF
O NLINE INTERMEDIARY LIAB. 669, 671 (2020).
183. Gould, supra note 41.
184. Mark H. Moore, Public Values In An Era Of Privatization: Introduction, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1223 (2003).
185. Elkin-Koren & Perel, supra note 182, at 671.
186. Elkin-Koren & Perel, supra note 182, at 671.
187. See Will Oremus, Facebook keeps researching its own harms — and burying the
findings, THE WASH. P OST (Sept. 16, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/
2021/09/16/facebook-files-internal-research-harms/ [https://perma.cc/7QTP-BFZD].
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The vital element of discretion is the ability to abuse it. In terms of
Section 230, a website does not open itself to civil claims when it merely
provides “a neutral means by which third parties can post information
of their own independent choosing online.”188 From the platforms’ perspective,
the incentive to censor user posts that offend management and sources of
revenues, like other users, far outweighs adhering to the optional First
Amendment standard of freedom of expression.
B. Platform’s Lack Transparency in Regulating Content
Platforms lack transparency in their exact content-removal processes
and procedures. The platforms, as private businesses, must protect their
proprietary property—content-filtering systems, algorithms, and other
intellectual property—inherently preventing a fully transparent business
model. Transparency, for its purpose here, is defined as “openness,
communication, and accountability.”189 Transparency builds user trust in
the company and helps the exchange of honest dealings. Facebook, YouTube,
and Twitter do voluntarily post transparency reports of varying degrees.190
However, voluntary transparency alone remains a suboptimal solution for
mitigating the problem of oppressive content regulation for two main
reasons.191 First, these reports are not held to any uniform standard, and
secondly, the reports come in varying degrees of disclosure.192 Yet, the
overall main trend for social media transparency is trending upward.
For example, Facebook took the next step in its attempt to provide
transparency without completely divulging trade secrets. Specifically, Facebook
announced construction of the Facebook Oversight Board (“FOB”) in
November of 2018.193 Facebook’s incentives for undergoing such a large
endeavor include building goodwill and trust with its users, maintaining

188.
189.

Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d at 1354.
Brian Carter, The Illusion Of Transparency In Social Media, SEARCH ENGINE
PEOPLE (Feb. 12, 2009) https://www.searchenginepeople.com/blog/the-illusion-of-transparencyin-social-media.html [https://perma.cc/6JZK-HPMA].
190. Transparency Reports, M ETA TRANSPARENCY CENTER , https://transparency.
fb.com/data/ [https://perma.cc/9EWS-3J6J]; Google Transparency Report, GOOGLE,
https://transparencyreport.google.com/youtube-policy/removals?hl=en [https://perma.cc/
M2TB-RNB3]; Twitter Transparency, TWITTER, https://transparency.twitter.com/ [https://
perma.cc/7DMR-4BME].
191. Michal Lavi, Evil Nudges, 21 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 11 (2018).
192. See Elkin-Koren & Perel, supra note 182, at 671.
193. Klonick, supra note 56, at 2418.
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viewership to help advertising revenue, or more cynically, establishing a
convenient scapegoat for diverting outside social and legal pressure.194 It
is a mutually beneficial move for the company and its users in developing
trust. To succeed, jurisdictional, intellectual, and financial independence
from Facebook must be established.195 Facebook’s legal division developed
a trust agreement and created a beneficiary for the trust—the Oversight
Board—and an LLC to handle the operation, both being independent
entities.196
The FOB’s first 5 rulings each tell Facebook what to do with a single piece
of content at issue; all but one are unanimous.197 Four rulings overturned
Facebook’s original decisions to remove posts, and only one ruling agreed
with Facebook’s removal of the post at issue.198 Where does this board get
its authority? In every case, the board first assesses Facebook’s decisions
against Facebook’s own standards and then against international human
rights law.199 But in all its rulings, the FOB came to the same conclusion
under both its own as well as international norms, and in no case did the
FOB confront the question of what happens if Facebook’s rules conflict
with international human rights law.200 Overall, increasing transparency
through oversight boards may not cure viewpoint discrimination, but increased
transparency will decrease viewpoint discrimination’s likelihood because
of independent review by external sources.
C. Viewpoint Discrimination
Section 230’s “Good Samaritan” safe harbor provision enables viewpoint
discrimination.201 Viewpoint discrimination refers to the silencing or muffling
the expression of disfavored viewpoints.202 Social media platforms have the
ability to abuse their regulatory discretion over content, and this must be
considered moving forward. The balance of selectively removing material
without overly inhibiting users’ expression is delicate and Section 230 does

194. Klonick, supra note 56, at 2426–27.
195. Klonick, supra note 56, at 2426–27.
196. Brent Harris, Establishing Structure and Governance for an Independent
Oversight Board, F ACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Sept. 17, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/
2019/09/oversight-board-structure [https://perma.cc/N6ER-LCV9].
197. Evelyn Douek, The Facebook Oversight Board’s First Decisions: Ambitious,
and Perhaps Impractical, LAWFARE (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
facebook-oversight-boards-first-decisions-ambitious-and-perhaps-impractical [https://
perma.cc/3WK5-N3D9].
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2018).
202. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1749, 1750.

444

SCHEURMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 23: 413, 2022]

5/10/2022 9:38 AM

Comparing Social Media Content
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.

not give discretionary guidance on how to balance removal of material
and expression of users.
Currently, online intermediaries are effectively performing three roles
at the same time: they act (1) like a legislature, in defining what constitutes
legitimate content on their platform, (2) like a judge who determine the
legitimacy of content in particular instances, and (3) like an administrative
agency who acts on these adjudications to block illegitimate content.203 A
user may post something, the system (most likely an algorithm) will remove
it, and then the user is expected to lodge a complaint to the same administration
that deemed removal of the post necessary with no independent external
review.204 The proprietary content-filtering systems used to regulate the
content effectively blend law enforcement and discretionary powers, signaling
a transformation in the traditional system of governance by law.205 Such
practices reflect an institutional shift in lawmaking power, from state to
private companies, and a fundamental transformation of the nature of law
enforcement.206
The American public is wary of this blend of law enforcement and
discretionary power. A survey conducted in June of 2020 found that roughly
three-quarters of US adults say it is very (37%) or somewhat (36%) likely
that social media sites intentionally censor political viewpoints that they
find objectionable.207 Roughly three-quarters of Americans (73%) think it
is very or somewhat likely that social media sites intentionally censor
political viewpoints the platforms find objectionable.208 Splitting these statistics
into party lines, 90% of Republicans surveyed felt that social media sites
intentionally censored political viewpoints that the sites found objectionable
203. Elkin-Koren & Perel, supra note 182, at 669–70.
204. See Appeal An Account Suspension Or Locked Account, TWITTER, https://
help.twitter.com/forms/general?subtopic=suspended [https://perma.cc/E468-PNG8] (for
example, Twitter allows appeals of post removals, which are reviewed by Twitter staff).
205. Elkin-Koren & Perel, supra note 182, at 672.
206. Elkin-Koren & Perel, supra note 182, at 672.
207. Emily A. Vogels et al., Most Americans Think Social Media Sites Censor
Political Viewpoints, P EW RSCH. CTR . (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/
internet/2020/08/19/most-americans-think-social-media-sites-censor-political-viewpoints/
[https://perma.cc/85WV-52U6]. For the analysis, Pew Research Center surveyed 4,708
U.S. adults from June 16 to 22, 2020. Everyone who took part is a member of the Center’s
American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national,
random sampling of residential addresses. Id. Nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of
selection. Id. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by
gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Id.
208. Id.

445

SCHEURMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/10/2022 9:38 AM

—with 60% saying this is very likely the case.209 By comparison, only
59% of Democrats believed censoring based on political views was very
(19%) or somewhat (40%) likely.210
A counter argument to this Article’s stance is the argument that the
market will adapt to the needs and demands of the supply; if people are
unhappy with a platform, they will use another competitor in the same or
similar service. If there are no competitors, then the market will meet the
rising demand, eventually producing a competitor. Yet, this argument
does not consider multiple factors. The first, is the similarity in political
views of the social media companies’ CEOs.211 Second, is the barriers to
entry of the market. If someone is censored from a social platform, one
needs to have access to the necessary capital, and underlying skills or
connections to someone with sufficient skills in coding to enter the market
as an unregulated social media platform.
There is a way to attack Section 230 besides the First Amendment—
through the legislature. Politically, there are two sides to the Section 230
debate: conservatives bemoan of big tech companies asserting liberal bias
against conservative speech and seek to prevent the platforms’ discretion
in removing content, while the liberal side complains of too little action
over hate speech, fake news, and other problematic content, and desires
obligations to remove such content.212 To simplify the positions, liberals
want the large social platforms to ramp up censorship, and conservatives
want the platforms to significantly reduce the current level of censorship.
The tremendous legal immunity for the platforms has not gone unnoticed.
Numerous political figures are attempting to reform, or even to dispose of,
Section 230.213 In May of 2020, former President Trump signed Executive
order 13925, effectively demanding Section 230 be revised.214 There are
now an influx of bills circulating in Congress. The list includes (1) EARN
IT Act of 2020, (2) Stopping Big Tech’s Censorship Act, (3) Platform
Accountability and Consumer Transparency Act, (4) Limiting Section
230 Immunity to Good Samaritans Act, and (5) the Online Freedom and

209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Ninety-eight percent (98%) of political contributions from internet companies
this Presidential cycle (2020) went to Democrat campaigns. See Ari Levy, Here’s The
Final Tally Of Where Tech Billionaires Donated For The 2020 Election, CNBC (Nov. 2,
2020, 8:42 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/02/tech-billionaire-2020-election-donationsfinal-tally.html [https://perma.cc/A8L6-XLJY].
212. Michael A. Cheah, Section 230 and the Twitter Presidency, 115 NW. U. L. REV.
192, 194 (2020).
213. Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34079 (May 28, 2020).
214. Id.
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Viewpoint Diversity Act.215 The Department of Justice even proposed
four prongs to focus reforming discussions on Section 230.216
One of the most extreme proposed acts, the Stopping Big Tech’s Censorship
Act, completely removes immunity under Section 230.217 The Stopping
Big Tech’s Censorship Act gives big tech companies the ability to earn
immunity through external audits.218 Big tech companies would have to
prove to the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) by clear and convincing
evidence that their algorithms and content-removal practices are politically
neutral.219 The bill only applies to companies with more than 30 million
active monthly users in the US, more than 300 million active monthly users
worldwide, or who have more than $500 million in global annual revenue.220

215. EARN IT Act of 2020, S. 3398, 116th Cong. (2020); Stopping Big Tech’s
Censorship Act, S. 4062, 116th Cong. (2020); Platform Accountability and Consumer
Transparency Act, S. 4066, 116th Cong. (2020); Limiting Section 230 Immunity to Good
Samaritans Act, S. 3983, 116th Cong. (2020); and Online Freedom and Viewpoint
Diversity Act, S. 4534, 116th Cong. (2020). See also Protecting Constitutional Rights from
Online Platform Censorship Act, H.R. 83, 117th Cong. (2021); CASE-IT Act, H.R. 285,
117th Cong. (2021); and See Something, Say Something Online Act of 2021, S. 27, 117th
Cong. (2021).
216. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 20-556, Department of Justice’s Review of Section 230 of
the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (2020) (“(1) Incentivizing online platforms to
address illicit content; (2) clarifying federal government enforcement capabili ties
to address unlawful content; (3) promoting competition; and (4) promoting open discourse
and greater transparency.”).
217. Stopping Big Tech’s Censorship Act, S.4062, 116th Cong. (2020 ); see also
Senator Hawley Introduces Legislation to Amend Section 230 Immunity for Big Tech
Companies, J OSH H AWLEY (June 19, 2019), https://www.hawley.senate.gov/senatorhawley-introduces-legislation-amend-section-230-immunity-big-tech-companies [https://
perma.cc/66V3-RW4Y] [hereinafter JOSH HAWLEY].
218. Stopping Big Tech’s Censorship Act, S.4062, 116th Cong. (2020); see also
Senator Hawley Introduces Legislation to Amend Section 230 Immunity for Big Tech
Companies, JOSH H AWLEY (June 19, 2019), https://www.hawley.senate.gov/senatorhawley-introduces-legislation-amend-section-230-immunity-big-tech-companies [https://
perma.cc/66V3-RW4Y].
219. Stopping Big Tech’s Censorship Act, S.4062, 116th Cong. (2020); see also Senator
Hawley Introduces Legislation to Amend Section 230 Immunity for Big Tech Companies,
JOSH HAWLEY (June 19, 2019), https://www.hawley.senate.gov/senator-hawley-introduceslegislation-amend-section-230-immunity-big-tech-companies [https://perma.cc/66V3-RW4Y].
220. Stopping Big Tech’s Censorship Act, S.4062, 116th Cong. (2020); see also
Senator Hawley Introduces Legislation to Amend Section 230 Immunity for Big Tech
Companies, JOSH HAWLEY (June 19, 2019), https://www.hawley.senate.gov/senatorhawley-introduces-legislation-amend-section-230-immunity-big-tech-companies [https://
perma.cc/66V3-RW4Y].
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Big tech companies would be responsible for the cost of conducting
audits, and reapplying for immunity every two years.221
Lastly, there is support for simply leaving Section 230 unchanged.222
The underlying reason for maintaining Section 230 originates from the statute
enabling the internet to grow exponentially into the unique asset it is today,
and also that Section 230 should not be tinkered with until broken. 223
Together, Section 230 and the First Amendment have contributed to the
Internet’s emergence as one of the most remarkable speech venues in human
history.224 Wikipedia’s crowdsourced encyclopedia, consumer review
websites like Yelp, and user-uploaded video sites like YouTube were simply
not possible in the offline world.225 These user generated content services
give Internet users an unprecedented ability to express themselves to a
global audience and also created many private benefits including new jobs
and wealth.226 Those supporting Section 230, as it stands, focus on Section
230 increasing litigation efficiency via its immunity defense, making litigation
more predictable than First Amendment claims, and Section 230’s ability to
cover claims that do not receive First Amendment protection.227
Ultimately, to protect citizens from viewpoint discrimination through
abuses of online censorship on otherwise lawful posts, the US must introduce
civil intermediary liability for social media providers under section 230(c).228
This goal of decreasing discretionary power of social media companies
over content regulation without encroaching on private governance of
social media business practices is possible.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS FOR DETERRING VIEWPOINT
DISCRIMINATION UNDER SECTION 230(C)(2)
Section 230(c)(1) has proven effective in protecting online platforms,
allowing the platforms to act with impunity and grow into the titans of
industry they are today, however, several solutions are feasible to update
Section 230(c)(2) to highly discourage abuses of biased social media content

221. Stopping Big Tech’s Censorship Act, S.4062, 116th Cong. (2020); see also Senator
Hawley Introduces Legislation to Amend Section 230 Immunity for Big Tech Companies,
JOSH HAWLEY (June 19, 2019), https://www.hawley.senate.gov/senator-hawley-introduceslegislation-amend-section-230-immunity-big-tech-companies [https://perma.cc/66V3RW4Y].
222. Goldman, supra note 125.
223. Goldman, supra note 125.
224. Goldman, supra note 125.
225. Goldman, supra note 125.
226. Goldman, supra note 125.
227. Goldman, supra note 125.
228. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 230.
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removal.229 The current problems with Section 230(c)(2), as discussed
above, are overbroad discretionary authority, limited transparency, and
viewpoint discrimination.230 The solutions to these problems can be found
in two possibilities. The first possibility is revision of the statutory language
of Section 230(c)(2). The second possibility is introduction of mandatory
federal censorship guidelines for each large-scale social media platform.
A. Revision of Statutory Language
First, the statutory language of (c)(2) may be restructured into granting
social media companies immunity from liability for removing posts only
if the posts contained illegal content or otherwise unprotected speech by
the First Amendment, treating the platforms equivalently to the government
for purposes of speech regulation.231 The authority for enforcement comes
from the federal statute, not the First Amendment. Thus, the social media
platforms may be sued civilly for violations of the statute if they remove
expression protected by the First Amendment.
For example, California’s Leonard Law, passed in 1992, grants students
at private universities free speech rights they can assert against their own
institution.232 The statute intended to transplant constitutional free speech
rights students have off campus and apply it on campus.233 However, the
Leonard Law protections are weaker than those provided by the First
Amendment.234 Specifically, institutional violations of the Leonard Law
229. See id. § 230(c)(2).
230. See Elkin-Koren & Perel, supra note 182, at 674–77; see also Matal, 137 S. Ct.
at 1750.
231. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (“No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be held liable on account of (A) any action voluntarily taken in
good faith to restrict access to or availability of material only if the posts contain illegal
content or otherwise unprotected speech by the First Amendment . . . or (B) any action
taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical
means to restrict access to material described.”) (emphasis added).
232. Cal. Educ. Code § 94367(a) (West 2009) (“No private postsecondary educational
institution shall make or enforce a rule subjecting a student to disciplinary sanctions solely
on the basis of conduct that is speech or other communication that, when engaged in
outside the campus or facility of a private postsecondary institution, is p rotected from
governmental restriction by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or
Section 2 of Article 1 of the California Constitution”) (emphasis added).
233. Id.
234. David Urban, Free Speech Rights at Private Colleges and Universities, CAL.
P UB. AGENCY & LAB. BLOG (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.calpublicagencylaboremploy
mentblog.com/first-amendment/free-speech-rights-at-private-colleges-and-universities/
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provide students only declaratory and injunctive remedies with the option
of attorney’s fees—not damages.235
The significance of a private entity’s censorship power over speech
being statutorily regulated is relevant here.236 Additionally, a compromise
of limiting the available remedy of the revised (c)(2) to the same Leonard
Law declaratory and injunctive relief with attorney’s fees option would
still grant the users their day in court while keeping damages reasonable
for social media companies.237 University of California Berkeley Law School
Dean Erwin Chemerinsky, in an online discussion regarding social media
and Section 230, discussed the Leonard Law and Section 230.238 Chemerinsky
stated “there needs to be a thorough rethinking of Section 230,” adding
that he would favor a law that forbids platforms from engaging in viewpoint
discrimination.239 Chemerinsky recognizes that the current Section 230,
as it stands now, is susceptible to viewpoint discrimination and even advocated
for the same type of preventative viewpoint discrimination measure taken
in the Leonard law.240
This revised section (c)(2) will solve the discretionary authority issue
of the social media companies by allowing review of the reasoning for
banning user content by a judicial body. Review by the court system weakens
the platforms’ autonomous governance over censoring and does not infringe
on (c)(1)’s purpose of blocking any sort of liability regarding social media
companies as publishing user content. The issue is the potential for
viewpoint discrimination based on the discretion of the platforms, not who
should be held accountable for the post. Addressing transparency, courts
will provide public records (redacted to the extent necessary to protect any
proprietary or personal information) of what sort of content is protected
and what is illegal. Concerning propriety filter-system knowledge, courts
#:~:text=In%20California%2C%20a%201992%20statute,in%20some%20way%20on%2
0campus [https://perma.cc/EX5U-9N8J]
235. Cal. Educ. Code § 94367(b) (2009).
236. See First Amendment on Private Campuses, HARV. CIV. RTS. – CIV. LIBERTIES
L. REV. (Dec. 1, 2015), https://harvardcrcl.org/first-amendment-on-private-campuses/
[https://perma.cc/PH7P-YPT7].
237. Although not statutorily prohibited, federal courts have been reluctant to resolve
constitutional controversies by means of declaratory judgments. The primary basis for
these denials tends to be that the claimed injury was too “remote or speculative.” RUSSELL
WEAVER ET AL., REMEDIES 203–04 (5th ed. 2019).
238. See Nicholas Iovino, Twitter’s Trump Ban Sets Dangerous Precedent for Free
Speech, Legal Scholar Warns, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.
courthousenews.com/twitters-trump-ban-sets-dangerous-precedent-for-free-speech-legalscholar-warns/ [https://perma.cc/8JP2-ZY9U].
239. Id.
240. Id. (statement of Erwin Chemerinsky) (“I advocated for the Leonard Law
because I think the values of free speech should be protected by private school administrations
as it would be by public school administrations.”).
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may utilize in camera proceedings to protect any proprietary information
the social platforms do not wish exposed to the public and its competitors.
The (c)(2) revision will additionally resolve the viewpoint discrimination
issue by granting civil remedy options to users who prove the social media
company knowingly censored the user’s content on the grounds of viewpoint
discrimination. The test for viewpoint discrimination is whether—within
the relevant subject category—the government has singled out a subset of
messages for disfavor based on the views expressed.241 If the social media
companies are to take the place of government actors via the revision, then
this test would apply when determining if a platform removes a post under
the First Amendment standard.
Alternatively, the introduction of a “bad faith” clause to deter broad removal
of minority ideals may be utilized in (c)(2).242 For example, inserting a
clause that prevents an online platform from removing user content the
provider knew did not violate freedom of expression will result in the good
faith safe harbor no longer applying, and reinstatement of civil liability.243
This “bad faith” clause puts a duty of care on the platform, but will not
overly-burden content moderation for the platforms because it places the
burden on the plaintiff to prove that the company knowingly reviewed the
user’s content and then removed it due to viewpoint discrimination.244 If
the removal occurred by algorithm, the platform is given a grace period
of ten days to enable the post after user appeal. If the platform does not
rectify the wrongful censorship in the set time period of ten days, the bad
faith clause is triggered. Upon being triggered, the bad faith may result in

241. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1750.
242. Bad faith, L. DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=21
[https://perma.cc/TLD5-7ERS] (defining bad faith as “intentional dishonest act by not
fulfilling legal or contractual obligations, misleading another, entering into an agreement
without the intention or means to fulfill it, or violating basic standards of honesty in
dealing with others.”).
243. An alternative statute with a bad faith clause inserted into it may read as follows:
No interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of (A) any action voluntarily
taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or (B) any action
taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical
means to restrict access to material described; and (C) no provider of an interactive
computer service may utilize sections (c)(1) or (c)(2) as defenses in legal proceedings if
the provider is found to have engaged in “bad faith” removal of content. 47 U.S.C. § 230
(c)(2) (emphasis added).
244. 47 U.S.C. § 230.
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fines, attorneys’ fees, sanctions, default judgment, or anything else within
judicial discretion to punish the bad faith offender.
B. Federal Guidelines for Independent Social Media Oversight Boards
The second possibility in solving the issues of Section 230(c)(2) is the
introduction of federally mandated Social Media Oversight Boards (“Oversight
Boards”). This proposal suggests the United States federal government
enacts statutes that require each large social media platform establish and
maintain an independent oversight board to review decisions regarding
removal of content. The Oversight Boards follow a similar structure to the
Facebook Oversight Board (“FOB”), along with the FOB’s respective
charter.245
The social media companies that will have the responsibility of
implementing these Oversight Boards meet any of the three following size
or revenue requirements: (1) more than thirty million active monthly users
in the US, or (2) more than 300 million active monthly users worldwide,
or (3) companies who have more than $500 million in global annual revenue.
This solution takes the FOB, and replicates it for each large social media
platform, requiring all designated social media platforms establish and
maintain an independent oversight board.
Prior to the Facebook Oversight Board’s creation, the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (“SOX Act”) created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(“PCAOB”).246 Large-scale auditing companies prior to the SOX Act were
self-regulated—just as the content regulation of social media companies
exists now.247 The lack of regulation ended with immense financial issues

245. Oversight Board Charter, FACEBOOK (Sept. 2019), https://about.fb.com/wpcontent/uploads/2019/09/oversight_board_charter.pdf; see generally 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2010)
(example of an oversight board).
246. 15 U.S.C. § 7201. The SOX Act created the PCAOB, which has four primary
duties: “(1) Register public accounting firms that prepare audit reports for issuers, brokers,
and dealers; (2) establish or adopt auditing and related attestation, quality control, ethics,
and independence standards; (3) inspect registered firms’ audits and quality control systems;
and (4) investigate and discipline registered public accounting firms and their associated
persons for violations of specified laws, rules, or professional standards.” “The Securities
and Exchanges Commission (“SEC”) has oversight authority over the PCAOB, including
the approval of the Board’s rules, standards, and budget.” About, PUB. CO. ACCT. OVERSIGHT
BD., https://pcaobus.org/about#:~:text=TTh%20PCAOB%20is%20a%20nonnonpro,accurate
%2C%20and%20indeindepen%20audit%20reports.&text=Inspect%20registered%20firm
s’%20audits%20and%20quality%20concont%20systems [https://perma.cc/TVY8-NMDA].
247. Andriy Blokhin, The Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, INVESTOPEDIA
(June 27, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/052815/what-impact-didsarbanesoxley-act-have-corporate-governance-unitedstates.asp#:~:text=After%20a%20
prolonged%20period%20of,public%20companies%20to%20defraud%20investors [https://
perma.cc/PJ4W-HCHX].
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and demonstrated public company auditing needed a government fence
post to keep it on the straight and narrow.248 Here, there is a distinction as
to what the PCAOB and Oversight Boards are overseeing, as freedom of
expression is a more fluid concept than whether a set of financial statements
hides or exhibits fraud. However, established and independent evaluation
of content removal is needed to prevent similar public injustice by the
discretionary bottleneck the social media companies hold over regulating
posts.249
The Oversight Boards follow the FOB’s lead, assigning authority to the
members of these Oversight Boards with jurisdictional, intellectual, and
financial independence of the board members from the social media
companies.250 The reviews by the Oversights Boards are to be “neutral,”
“independent judgments” that are rendered “impartially” with no influential
pressure from the respective platform.251 However, the adjudicating members
of the Oversight Boards still need a firm grasp of the relevant laws and
how to apply those laws, while also being familiar with the social media
industry. Furthermore, the FOB Charter specifies that each review panel
for each case will contain “at least one member from the region” where
the case arose.252 Conflicts of interest would need to be thoroughly researched
to prevent the possibility of inequitable rulings.
Regarding the governance relationship between the proposed Oversight
Boards and the necessary legal structure, the FOB’s structure is once
again a viable precedent. Between the FOB, legal Trust, and Facebook,
the Charter states that the FOB is to “review content and issue reasoned,
public decisions” and “provide advisory opinions on Facebook’s content
policies.”253 The Trust’s responsibilities are to fund FOB’s budget and
appoint and remove members of FOB, while Facebook’s responsibilities are
to “commit to the board’s independent oversight on content decisions and
the implementation of those decisions,” to fund the Trust, to appoint trustees,
and to “contract for services” with the FOB.254 If this legal structure is
replicated across the required platforms, it will allow each Oversight Board

248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Klonick, supra note 56.
251. Oversight Board Charter, FACEBOOK, art. 1 (Sept. 2019), https://about.fb.com/
wp-content/uploads/2019/09/oversight_board_charter.pdf.
252. See id. art. 1, § 2.
253. Id. art. 3, § 2.
254. Id. art. 5, § 1.
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to be self-sustaining and maintain autonomy in its decision-making
processes.
As for adopting uniform standards of assessment among the Oversight
Boards, it is possible to allow the Oversight Boards, based on their platforms,
to individualize the assessment standards. The FOB uses Facebook’s set
of values to guide its content policies and decisions.255 The FOB reviews
content enforcement decisions and determines whether they were consistent
with Facebook’s content policies and values. 256 For each decision, any
prior board decisions have precedential value and are to be viewed as
highly persuasive when the facts, applicable policies, or other factors are
substantially similar, and when reviewing decisions, the board pays particular
attention to the impact of removing content in light of human rights norms
protecting free expression.257 Consistent and reliable protection against
viewpoint discrimination is feasible with this model.
The Oversight Boards proposed will apply only to users based within
the US as to avoid jurisdictional issues for users based outside the US and
allow uniform application of US legal standards to all reviews. Additionally,
the Oversight Boards shall follow the FOB’s specification that each review
panel for each case will contain “at least one member from the region” where
the case arose.258 Foreign cases will add more expenses and consume more
time than strictly keeping the Oversight Boards domestic. 259 Once the
Oversight Boards are established and functioning adequately, then expanding
into foreign jurisdictions may be possible.
In terms of end results, the Oversight Boards decide whether to allow
or remove the content properly brought to it for review.260 The board can
also uphold or reverse a designation that led to an enforcement outcome,
such as deciding that content depicts graphic violence, and should therefore
display a warning screen.261 The financial burden is put on the social media
companies as a business expense. However, only the social media companies
meeting the statutory requirements of sufficient scope or revenue shoulder
the additional burden and will have sufficient notice to plan accordingly.
Given the current political and health-adverse climate, implementation
of these Oversight Boards may take several years to realize, and FOB is
still a fledgling in terms of a case study. Yet, it is quite a promising solution.
First, platforms’ overbroad discretion will be put in check through independent

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

454

Id. art. 5.
Id. art. 2, § 2.
Id.
Id. art. 2, § 2.
Id. art. 3, § 2.
Id. art. 5, § 3.
Id. art. 3, § 5.

SCHEURMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 23: 413, 2022]

5/10/2022 9:38 AM

Comparing Social Media Content
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.

review reports and established case precedent. Second, transparency would
be addressed through the detailed public reports available after every
decision.262 Third, viewpoint discrimination will be significantly diminished
by the independent, neutral review process. These solutions do not
disincentive regulation of intellectual property violations or criminal
content, and simultaneously put in measures to combat involuntary or
biased censorship of lawful expression.
VI. CONCLUSION
Social media companies are here to stay. Their massive growth combined
with their societal influence opens up worlds of possibilities: both good
and bad. As technology advances, so must the methods used to ensure
individual expression. Achieving the goal of decreasing discretionary
power of social media company censorship to viewpoint discrimination
of lawful user-posted content, while preserving private governance of social
media business practices, is achievable. This goal is possible through two
methods: (1) restructuring (c)(2) to grant social media companies immunity
from liability for removing posts only if the posts contain illegal content
or otherwise unprotected speech by the First Amendment, and (2) through
Social Media Oversight Boards. Section 230 sheltered the internet companies
during their adolescence, but now the internet companies can fend for
themselves. It is time for the new era of user focused protection to begin.

262.

Id. art. 3, § 5.
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